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The Impact of Howard Johnson on the Labor Obligations 9£
the Successor Employer
The extent to which a successor to the ownership of a business
must assume the labor obligations of the preceding owner is a muchclouded issue of federal labor law. In a series of decisions beginning
in 1964, the Supreme Court has attempted to resolve the conflicting
interests of employers and employees in the successorship context. It
has reached seemingly inconsistent conclusions, however, and thus
has left business planners and unions without clear guidelines to
facilitate smooth transitions in ownership. In its most recent decision, Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, 1
the Court held that a bona fide purchaser of the assets of a business
that continues to operate the business but hires only a handful of its
predecessor's employees is under no obligation to honor an arbitration
clause in its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
This Note assesses the impact of Howard Johnson on the laborlaw obligations of successor employers. Part I analyzes the prior case
law; part II critiques the reasoning of the Howard Johnson opinion;
part III considers the merits of a new approach to the successorship
problem, suggested in a footnote in Howard Johnson.

I.

PRIOR CASE LAW

The import of Howard Johnson can best be assessed by examining the Court's earlier decisions in the successorship field. At issue
in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 2 the first of these decisions, were
the obligations of Wiley, the surviving corporation of a merger, under
a collective-bargaining agreement signed by Interscience, the corporation that had disappeared in the merger. The Interscience bargaining
agreement contained an arbitration clause but no provision purporting to make the agreement binding on any successor to Interscience.
After the merger, Wiley employed virtually all of the Interscience
employees; first, at the Interscience plant, which Wiley continued to
operate for a time substantially as before the merger, and, subsequently, at the much larger nonunion Wiley plant. 3 The labor union
1. 417 U.S. 249 (1974), noted in The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAR.v. L.

R.Ev. 43, 265 (1974).
2. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
3. In Wiley, the Supreme Court found "the wholesale transfer of Interscience employees to the Wiley plant" to be significant, but omitted the fact that this transfer
occurred some time after the date of the merger. 376 U.S. at 551. The latter fact
was noted in the Howard Johnson opinion. 417 U.S. at 258 n.4, citing Interscience
Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 210, 218-20 (1970). The Court's failure to make
the facts upon which it relied entirely explicit has complicated interpretation of its
holdings in these cases. Cf. Feller, Status of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
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representing the Interscience employees sued under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act4 to compel Wiley to arbitrate
various claims pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Interscience
bargaining agreement.
The Supreme Court, holding for the union, stated that "the
disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement,
and that, in appropriate circumstances, present here, the successor
employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the
agreement."11 In finding that, despite traditional contract principles, a
nonconsenting nonsignatory to a collective bargaining agreement
could be bound by at least some of its terms, 6 the Court relied heavily
on the national labor policy in favor of settling disputes through
arbitration7 and on the proposition that a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract, but rather a formulation of the
"common law'' of the shop. 8 National labor policy, the Court asserted,
required "1hat the rightful prerogative of owners independently to
rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers
be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden
Under Wiley v. Livingston: A Union Counsel's View, 18 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAnon
277,281 (1966).
4. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1970).
5. 376 U.S. at 548. The Court first decided that the question whether or not
the company had to arbitrate was one for the courts rather than the arbitrator to
decide. 376 U.S. at 546-47. It further held that questions of "procedural arbitrability" should be left to the arbitrator. 376 U.S. at 555-59. While these holdings were
significant aspects of Wiley, they do not bear on the successor employer issues with
which this Note is concerned and thus will not be dealt with herein. For discussion
of these issues, see Note, Procedural Arbitrability Under Section 301 of the LMRA,
73 YALE LJ. 1459 (1964); The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HAR.v. L. RBv. 143,
285 (1964).
6. Although the Court did note that the surviving corporation in a merger is ordinarily liable for the debts and contracts of the disappearing corporation, 376 U.S.
at 550 n.3, its decision did not rest on this ground but rather on "[f]ederal law, fa.
shioned 'from the policy of our national labor laws.'" 376 U.S. at 548. Nor was
Wiley's obligation based on any sort of privity with Interscience in an ordinary contract sense. The potentially profound impact of this view of the collective bargaining
agreement on labor law developments was quickly noted. See, e.g., Feller, supra note
3, at 277-79; Platt, The NLRB and the Arbitrator in Sale and Merger Situations,
19 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 375, 375-78 (1967).
7. 376 U.S. at 549-50. The Court had previously emphasized this policy in the
"Steelworkers Trilogy," Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960), Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960),
and Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). One
commentator found that "[t]he overriding importance of Wiley is that it expresses
an unmistakable preference for private arbitration as the forum to resolve representation and contract problems involving ownership changes." Lippman, Changes of
Ownership and Representation Problems: A Union View, 18 N.Y.U. CoNF. ON
LABOR 135, 324 (1966).
8. 376 U.S. at 550.
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change in the employment relationship." 9 Since employees and their
union were likely to be excluded from negotiations leading to a
change in corporate ownership, which could greatly affect their interests, the enforcement of an arbitration clause would ease the transition and reduce industrial strife.10
Wiley left unclear the circumstances under which it was appropriate to impose a duty to arbitrate. One interpretation was that Wiley
applied only to merger cases, where state law required the surviving
corporation to assume the liabilities and obligations of the merged
corporation.11 Most authorities12 concluded, however, that Wiley
applied in the purchase-of-assets context as well, largely because of
the Wiley Court's statement that
[i]t would derogate from "the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration" . . . if a change dn the corporate structure or
ownership of a business enterprise had the automatic consequence
of removing a duty to arbitrate previously established; this is so as
much in cases like the present, where the contracting employer disappears into another by merger, as in those in which one owner
replaces another but the business entity remains the same. 13
The Wiley Court did suggest that it would be inappropriate to
impose a duty to arbitrate on a new employer in the absence of "any
substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise before and
after a change [of ownership or corporate structure]."14 The NLRB
had previously used a similar "continuity of the business enterprise
test'' in determining the propriety of imposing on -a successor employer a duty to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union. 15
Drawing upon the NLRB's experience in these representation cases, 16
courts applying Wiley looked to three interrelated factors in determin- _
ing whether the identity of an enterprise had been continued: the
9. 376 U.S. at 549.
10. 376 U.S. at 549. This view of the balance between employer rights and employee rights met a mixed reception from the commentators. Compare Lippman,
supra note 7, at 316, with Shaw & Carter, Sales, Mergers and Union Contract Relations, 19 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 357, 374 (1967) (Court's approach too burdensome to employer and potentially dangerous to employees whose jobs may depend
on new employer's willingness to take on business).
11. See, e.g., Shaw & Carter, supra note 10, at 366-69.
12. See, e.g., McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc.,
335 .J:<'.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332
F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964); Barbash, Status of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Under Wiley v. Livingston: A Management Counsel's View, 18 N.Y.U. CoNF. ON
LABOR 259, 269 (1966); Feller, supra note 3, at 282. Cf. Golden State Bottling Co.
v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182n.5 (1973). But see Shaw & Carter, supra note 10.
13. 376 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added).
14. 376 U.S. at 551.
15. See Stonewall Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 325, 327 (1948) (whether any "essential attribute of the employment relationship has been changed as a result of the
transfer'').
16. NLRB cases are collected in Feller, supra note 3, at 287 n.18.
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degree of continuity in the work force, the similarity of operation
before and after the ownership change, and the degree to which assets
were transferred.
Continuity in the work force was for most courts the most important single factor in deciding whether to impose a duty to arbitrate on
the successor employer, 17 although no court considered whether such
continuity alone would be determinative. 18 In considering the similarity of operation, courts looked to whether the same jobs were being
performed in the same way as before, whether the size and structure
of the successor company was significantly different from that of the
predecessor,19 and, to a lesser degree, whether the enterprise's products, services, and supervisory personnel remained the same, whether
the operation was carried on in the same location, and whether there
was any hiatus in operations in the transition. 20 As to the transfer of
assets, courts looked to the carry-over of physical assets, like plant
and equipment, the carry-over of intangibles, like trademarks, customer lists, and goodwill, and, to some extent, the assumption of a
predecessor's liabilities and obligations. 21 These factors seemed to indicate whether the business had been significantly changed from the
employee's point of view, whether the transfer preserved the appearance of a continuing enterprise in the eyes of third parties, and
whether there existed a nexus between the successive employers
upon which to base the transfer of labor obligations. 22
17. Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L.
REv. 735, 793-95 (1969). See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc.,
335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332
F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964). A notable exception is Monroe Sandet Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967), in which arbitration
was ordered although no employees covered by the bargaining agreement were retained when the parent corporation shut down the subsidiary at which they worked
and shifted operations in the area to a different, newly acquired subsidiary.
18. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 17, at 751 (stating that courts had not let successorship be defeated by the employer's failure to retain employees when there had been
a substantial transfer of assets and the operation of the business remained much the
same).
19. See Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employer SuccessorshipA Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1056-57 (1973).
20. See id. at 1056-63 (concluding that these factors have not been consistently
applied).
21. See Goldberg, supra note 17, at 804.
22. The degree to which the employees' point of view should be controlling is
a matter of some dispute. Compare Goldberg, supra note 17, at 754, with Local 954,
Retail Store Employees v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 655, 658-59 (N.D.
Ohio 1966), and St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 269, 275 (1973). St. Antoine argues that there must be some "nexus" at the employer "end of the relationship" more
significant than "the bare movement of employees from one employer to another,"
id., while Goldberg suggests that the continuity of work force may be enough of a
transfer of "assets" to justify imposing a duty to bargain on the successor. Goldberg,
supra, at 749-50.
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Courts applying Wiley also derived from that case a second
limiting factor on the imposition of a duty to arbitrate: the possibility
of inter-union conflicts. In Wiley, the Court noted in passing that
there was no problem of union conflicts since the Wiley employees
were not organized. 23 In applying Wiley, courts refused to order
arbitration where, because of the presence of more than one union,
the arbitration award would have been unenforceable or would simply have fostered industrial strife, or where the employer would have
been put in the position of committing an unfair labor practice. 24
Commentators concluded, however, that Wiley did not mandate a
denial of arbitration when two unions were involved; one suggested
that Wiley supported three-party arbitration; 25 another, that arbitrators could simply weigh the possible unrest that their granting of
particular claims would cause and shape their awards accordingly. 26
In addition to leaving unclear the circumstances under which it
would be appropriate to require a successor employer to arbitrate,
Wiley provided little guidance on the proper standards for arbitrators
to use and on possible substantive limits on arbitration awards. It
seemed clear, on the one hand, that the imposition of a duty to
arbitrate was meaningless unless an arbitrator could require compliance with substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement
and, on the other hand, that the arbitrator was required to consider
the factors unique to the successorship context. Most courts and
commentators therefore viewed Wiley as giving new freedom and
responsibility to the arbitrator: 27 Whereas an arbitrator's duty in a
labor dispute ordinarily was to interpret and apply the terms of the
contract, in the successorship context it was left to the arbitrator to
decide the extent to which each of the collective bargaining agreement's terms was to remain in force. 28
23. 376 U.S. at 551-52 n.5.
24. See, e.g., Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc.,
374 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967); McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F.2d
3S2 (2d Cir. 1966). McGuire wins approval in Shaw & Carter, supra note 10, at
372. The general emphasis on a retained majority of employees is, in part, a safeguard against the acute danger to an employer of committing an unfair labor practice
by bargaining with a minority union.
25. Barbash, supra note 12, at 271. Cf. Lippman, supra note 7, at 324.
26. Goldberg, supra note 17, at 760.
27. "The requirements of the contract remain basic guides to the law of the shop,
but the arbitrator may find that equities inherent in changed circumstances require
an award in a particular controversy at variance with some term or terms of that
contract." United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d
Cir. 1964). Accord, Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d
9S4, 958 (9th Cir. 1964). The underlying assumption of these cases seems to have
been that, without this permission to adapt the relief given to the circumstances of
the case, the arbitrator would be required to enforce the collective bargaining contract in all its terms.
28. See Note, The Successor Employer's Duty To Arbitrate: A Reconsideration
of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 84 HARv. L. REv. 418, 426 (1968). The
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A final issue raised by the Wiley decision was whether substantive
terms of a collective bargaining agreement could be imposed on a
successor employer by courts or the NLRB rather than by an arbitrator. Although the Court stated its holding in Wiley strictly in terms
of an obligation to arbitrate, the language of the opinion suggested
that other terms of a collective bargaining agreement might also survive and bind a successor employer. 29 Thus, while the extent of a
successor employer's obligations would typically be raised in actions
to compel arbitration because of the prevalence of arbitration clauses
in collective bargaining agreements, it seemed only reasonable that,
in cases where there was no arbitration clause, a court could determine
that the agreement or parts thereof survived a change of ownership. 30
The next logical extension of Wiley was to view it as permitting
enforcement of the surviving agreement by the NLRB. 31 Under
section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act32 (NLRA), an
employer commits an unfair labor practice by refusing "to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees"; under section
8(d), 33 the duty to bargain collectively includes a duty to honor a
collective bargaining agreement during its term. It seemed, therefore, that a refusal by a new employer to honor a collective bargaining
freedom given the arbitrator in such cases was not universally welcomed, see, e.g.,
Shaw & Carter, supra note 10, at 270-72, but may not have been a great departure
from the usual practices of arbitrators, see Goldberg, supra note 17, at 786 & n.169.
Since very few ca5es of this sort have actually resulted in an arbitrator's award, id.
at 746 n.45; Slicker, supra note 19, at 1085-86, conclusions as to the actual standards
used are difficult to draw. Nevertheless, the guidelines provided by the courts in
these cases are significant in determining the rights and obligations of a successor
employer.
29. See Feller, supra note 3, at 283.
30. See id.; Goldberg, supra note 17, at 746. But cf. Barbash, supra note 12,
at 267.
In a rare section 301 case to present the issue, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, citing Wiley, held that the court could find a successor employer to be in
breach of a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See Teamsters Local 249
v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956 (1974). The court noted that "the policies
of our national labor law weigh heavily in favor of a doctrine that preserves intact
the employees' bargained-for rights and duties, or at least a portion of them." 493
F.2d at 963 (emphasis added). There is a question still as to the courts' ability to
enforce only selected parts of a collective bargaining agreement even if the successor
should be found to be bound by the agreement. One of the claims made for arbitration, it may be recalled, is the arbitrator's unique flexibility and expertise in deciding
which terms of the agreement should be enforced against a successor employer. In
Bill's Trucking, successorship was based on a sale of stock; courts may be more hesitant to undertake the difficult task of enforcing some terms of a contract in situations
where successorship is not so solidly grounded.
31. See Comment, The Impact of John Wiley Revisited-From the Vindication
of Policy to the Verge of Iniquity, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875 (1970) (predicting and
criticizing this result of the "cross-fertilization" of the courts and the NLRB).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
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agreement that survived a transfer of a business would be an unfrur
labor practice actionable by the NLRB.34
The prevailing view after Wiley of a successor employer's obligations under its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement was
significantly altered by the Supreme Court's second successor-employer decision, NLRB v. Burns lnternatlonal Security Services,
lnc. 35 Through a competitive -bidding process, Burns Security obtained a contract to provide protection services at a Lockheed Aircraft plant. In assembling its work force of forty-two, Bums
transferred fifteen guards from other Bums locations and hired
twenty-seven guards formerly employed by Wackenhut, the previous
contractor with Lockheed. Four months earlier, the Wackenhut employees had elected a union as their exclusive bargaining representative, and, two months thereafter, the union had signed a three-year
collective bargaining agreement with Wackenhut. Upon Bums' refusal to honor the agreement or even to recognize the union, unfrur
labor practice proceedings were brought against it. The Board, using
Wiley for the first time to impose contract obligations on a successor
employer, held that, as a successor to Wackenhut, Bums was obligated both to recognize and bargain with the union and to honor
the terms of the existing collective bargaining contract. 36 Successorship was based on the fact that a majority of Bums' guards were
former Wackenhut employees and were performing for Bums essentially the same jobs in the same locatiop. ·as they had for Wackenhut.
On review, 37 the Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of a duty
to recognize and bargain with the union; it stated that such a duty
arises "where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority
of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a
recently certified bargaining agent." The -Court concluded, however,
that the NLRB could not enforce the collective bargaining agreement
because Bums had neither signed it nor consented to be bound by it.
The Court distinguished Wiley on three grounds. 38 First, Wiley
involved a merger and was therefore set against a background of state
law requiring the surviving corporation to assume the obligations of
the disappearing corporation. Second, in Wiley there had been close
ties between the two employers, whereas between Wackenhut and
Bums there had been no relationship whatsoever. Finally, Wiley was
a section 301 suit to compel arbitration rather than an unfair labor
34. See Feller, supra note·3, at 289.
35. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
36. William J. Burns Intl. Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970).
37. The court of appeals had refused to enforce the portion of the Board's order
requiring Burns to honor the substantive terms of the contract, although it did order
enforcement of the bargaining order. :William J. Burns Intl. Detective Agency, Inc.
v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971).
38. See 406 U.S. at 285-86.
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practice action in which, under section 8(d) of the NLRA, 30 the
NLRB's powers to impose terms on an unconsenting party are severely limited.
Section 8(d), as construed in H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 40
prohibits the NLRB from requiring bargaining parties to make any
concession or to agree on any terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Viewing this provision as embodying the fundamental premise
of the federal labor law that the resolution of employer-union disputes
is to occur through free collective bargaining or voluntary arbitration
rather than through governmental imposition of compulsory terms,
the Burns Court concluded that employers and unions "are free from
having contract provisions imposed upon them against their will." 41 It
was this fundamental principle that the Board, in imposing the bargaining agreement on Burns, had failed to heed. The imposition on
Burns of a duty to bargain with the union, the Court stated, was not
inconsistent with this conclusion; that duty arose not from the collective bargaining agreement, which Burns had not consented to be
bound by, but from the fact that Burns "voluntarily took over a
bargaining unit that was largely intact and that had been certified
within the past year." 42 On a policy level, the Court noted that "[a]
potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business
only if he can make changes in corporate structure, composition of
the labor force, work location, task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and conditions of
employment contained in the old collective-bargaining contract may
make these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit the
transfer of capital." 43
Burns raised a number of questions regarding its application in
the duty-to-bargain context and its effect on Wiley. 44 With regard to
the duty to bargain, the Court assumed that the collective bargaining
unit remained appropriate in Burns, and therefore it provided little
guidance as to what factors are relevant in determining the appropriateness of a unit after a change of ownership. By stressing that the
majority of Burns' new work force had been employed by Burns'
organized predecessor, 45 the Court seemed to follow the established
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
40. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
41. 406 U.S. at 287.
42. 406 U.S. at 287.
43. 406 U.S. at 287-88.
44. For a fuller discussion of these questions and of developments in the duty
to bargain area, see Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975).
45. The "majority" of which the Court spoke was of the employees hired by the
new employer, not a majority of the old work force. While this has been generally
understood, the latter interpretation has been championed. See Zim's Foodliner, Inc.
v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1139-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
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proposition that, if less than a majority of his new work force is from
the old, an employer need not bargain with the old employees' union
since that union could not be presumed to represent a majority of his
employees. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting on the issue of Burns' duty
to bargain, persuasively argued that the fact of a large-scale transfer
of employees should not be conclusive of the duty to bargain since a
variety of differences between the old and new enterprises could
render the old bargaining unit inappropriate. 46 Commentators47
seemed to agree with this logic, and the prevailing view after Burns
seemed to be that, despite its emphasis on the identity of the work
force, Burns did not render irrelevant the other factors considered in
determining successorship in earlier section 301 suits and NLRB
representation cases. 48
Burns was also unclear as to the point at which the duty to
bargain arises when the bargaining unit remains appropriate. In
Burns, the duty apparently did not arise until Burns' hiring was
completed because the majority status of former Wackenhut employees was not clearly established until that time. 49 The Court's opinion
implied, however, that the duty might arise sooner under different
circumstances: "[T]here will be instances in which it is perfectly
clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the
unit and in which it will be appropriate to have him initially consult
with the employees' bargaining representative before he fixes
terms." 50 Because the Court failed to expand on this point, courts
and commentators had difficulty applying it to specific successorship
situations. 51
46. Joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Powell, Justice Rehnquist first noted that the number of Wackenhut employees hired by Bums did not
mathematically ensure that a majority of the Bums employees had supported the
union. That determination, he said, had not been made independently, but had been
based on the theory that Bums was a successor, and therefore bound. The imposition
of the duty to bargain was justified then only if the successorship doctrine was properly applied to this case, which, Rehnquist said, it was not: The interests of industrial stability and employee protection must be balanced with those of employer
freedom, and freedom of employees in choosing bargaining representatives. The obligations of successorship may properly be imposed on the employer who enjoys the
benefit of tangible or intangible assets of a predecessor, but should not attach when
"the only connection between the two employing entities is a naked transfer of employees." 406 U.S. at 307. "Phrased another way," Rehnquist stated, "the doctrine
of successorship in the federal common law of labor relations accords to employees
the same general protection against transfer of assets by an entity against which they
have a claim as is accorded by other legal doctrines to nonlabor-related claimants
against the same entity." 406 U.S. at 305.
47. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 275; Note, supra note 44, at 765-71.
48. See text at notes 15-22 supra.
49. 406 U.S. at 295.
50. 406 U.S. at 294-95.
51. See Spitzer Akron, Inc. v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1972), vacated
and remanded, 411 U.S. 979 (1973); NLRB v. Denham, 469 F.2d 239 (9th Cir.
1972), vacated and remanded, 411 U.S. 945 (1973); NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet
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The effect of Burns on Wiley quickly became a subject of much
debate. 52 A necessary corollary to Wiley's holding that a successor
employer could be required to arbitrate under his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement was that some if not all of the substantive
terms of such an agreement could survive a change in ownership. 113
Yet Burns strongly implied that the NLRB could not compel a new
employer to honor any substantive terms of his predecessor's contract,
and it arguably imposed similar restrictions on the powers of the
federal courts.
Some writers, seizing on the Court's suggested distinction between
Wiley as a section 301 suit to compel arbitration and Burns as an
unfair labor practice case before the NLRB, strongly urged that
Burns represented less a denial of the principles of Wiley than a
limitation on the powers of the Board. 54 These writers found a clearcut justification for the fact that the Board, on this reading, was
precluded from providing a remedy in the successorship context that
federal courts could provide: the Board was limited by the NLRA to
either enforcing a contract as a whole or not enforcing it at all, while
the federal courts were more flexible because of their ability to
fashion a federal common law in the labor area. 65
A second distinction quickly noted was that the policy in favor of
arbitration strongly expressed in Wiley was not diminished by
Burns. 56 Thus, even if Burns prohibited courts as well as the NLRB
from enforcing substantive terms on unconsenting successors, it did
not preclude enforcement of an arbitration provision. This preferred
Corp., 468 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 411 U.S. 912 (1973);
NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center, Inc., 465 F.2d 1039, 1042 (6th Cir. 1972);
Ranch Way, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded,
406 U.S. 940 (1972); Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194 (1974); Nash, Successorship in Light of Burns, 1 GA. L. REV. 664, 678 ( 1973).
52. See, e.g., Morris & Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. REV. 1359 (1973); St. Antoine,
supra note 22, at 272-77; Note, Contract Rights and the Successor Employer: The
Impact of Burns Security, 71 MICH. L. REv. 571 (1973).
53. See text at notes 29-30 supra.
54. See Morris & Gaus, supra note 52; Note, supra note 52.
55. See generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
Some commentators were not so ready to embrace the proposition that Burns had
enthroned choice of forum-the courts or the NLRB-as a crucial determinant of
the parties' substantive rights. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 50, 255-56 (1972). One commentator, although apparently agreeing that
Burns and Wiley could be reconciled by emphasizing the contrast between the common-law flexibility of the federal courts and the limitations placed on the Board,
Note, Contractual Successorship: The Impact of Burns, 40 U. CHI. L. REV, 617, 61819, 626-27 ( 1973), expressed doubts about the value of any successorship doctrine,
id. at 627-31, and was troubled by the "judicial" power that devolves upon arbitrators
in successorship situations, id. at 631-35.
56. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713,
726-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, supra note 55, at 256.
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position for arbitration, it was urged, was appropriate because of the
arbitrator's expertise and flexibility in adapting contract obligations to
the circumstances of a particular successorship case. 57
The Court's suggestion that Wiley could be distinguished from
Burns on the basis of the merger aspects of Wiley and the background
of state law against which it was set was generally regarded by
commentators58 as unpersuasive in view of the fact •that the Wiley
holding was expressly presented as a matter of federal labor law:
While the Court in Wiley emphasized that Wiley was required under
state law to assume the obligations and liabilities of its predecessor,
Interscience, the Court nowhere intimated that the arbitration clause
of the collective bargaining agreement signed by Interscience was
binding on Wiley only through the operation of state law. 59 In any
case, resistance was natural to limiting Wiley to merger situations
since other forms of ownership succession could be indistinguishable
from mergers in their effect and Wiley had been applied regularly
outside of the merger context. 60
A final distinction between Wiley and Burns was that Wiley and
its progeny typically had arisen in merger .or purchase-of-assets contexts rather than, like Burns, in the context of competitive bidding. A
distinction based on the relationship between the two employers
therefore seemed well founded since Burns was not a typical successorship case. 61 There had been no transfer of assets or dealings of
any kind between Burns and Wackenhut. Justice Rehnquist, concurring in Burns on the issue of contract enforcement, supported this
distinction by arguing that ·"[i]f we deal with the legitimate expectations of employees that the employer who agreed to the collectivebargaining contract perform it, we can require another employing
entity to perform the contract only when he has succeeded to some of
the tangible or intangible assets by the use of which the employees
might have expected the first employer to have performed his contract
with them." 62 Moreover, he reasoned, to require an employer who
has hired a competitor's former employees to honor the terms of an
agreement between the employees and the competitor would tend to
"import unwarranted rigidity into labor-management relations." 63
57. See Note, supra note 52, at 582-86, 590. But see St. Antoine, supra note 22,
at 273 (expressing the view that Burns would have been decided the same way even
if it had been a section 301 suit to secure arbitration or to enforce an arbitral award).
58. See St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 273; Slicker, supra note 19, at 1101; Note;
supra note 52, at 577.
59. See note 6 supra.
60. See cases cited in note 12 supra.
61. See St Antoine, supra note 22, at 270 ("[11he first, and perhaps the most
critical, point to be made about Burns is that it hardly represents a typical successorship situation, if indeed it can fairly be called a successorship at all").
62. 406 U.S. at 305.
63. 406 U.S. at 308.
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Reconciliation of Burns and Wiley on the basis of the relationships between the employers left open the possibility that, in a successorship case more typical than Burns, the NLRB could enforce a
collective bargaining agreement that it found to have survived the
change in ownership or corporate structure. 64 Yet, the Burns Court's
invocation of the national labor policy against the imposition of
contract terms by the Board on an unconsenting party carried the
broad implication that the Board could never enforce substantive
terms of a collective bargaining agreement against a successor employer. Thus, notwithstanding the factual differences between Wiley
and Burns, it was this clear implication in Burns that the Board and
the lower courts found controlling. 65
Despite the possibility of reconciling the holdings of Burns and
Wiley, the two cases evinced fundamentally different attitudes toward
the collective bargaining agreement and toward the interests at stake
in the typical successorship situation. Whereas Wiley had taken the
view that the collective bargaining agreement was a special sort of
arrangement, free at times from the restrictions of ordinary contract
law, 66 Burns seemed to signal a return to traditional contract principles. 67 Also, while Wiley emphasized the employees' need for protection in an ownership transition situation and the national policy
favoring the avoidance of industrial strife through peaceful settlement
of disputes by arbitration, Burns focused on the new employer's need
for freedom to rearrange his business and the national policy supporting free collective bargaining. 68 It was this clear difference in attitude that led one writer to conclude that "[t]he future development
of successorship law undoubtedly depends far more on the way the
members of the Supreme Court ultimately balance out these compet64. See St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 276.
65. See, e.g., NLRB v. Polytech, Inc., 469 F.2d 1226, 1227 (8th Cir. 1972);
Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 80 L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972). See also
Note, supra note 52, at 580.
66. See 376 U.S. at 548-49; Morris & Gaus, supra note 52, at 1366.
67. This shift was widely noted. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 276;
Note, supra note 52, at 582. The conclusion, it seemed, could be drawn that "Burns
stands for the basic proposition that a successor will not be held liable under its pred•
ecessor's labor contract unless it has actually assumed such responsibility in fact or
in law," Benetar, Successorship Liability Under Labor Agreements, 1973 Wis. L. Rnv.
1026, 1035, or even that "[b]y reading Wiley and Burns together and giving vitality
to each, the conclusion seems inescapable that the substantive terms of the contract
survive, whether by decision of the arbitrator or the NLRB, only if the successor in
word or deed manifests an intent to be bound thereby." Slicker, supra note 19, at
1102. See also Pate, The Impact of Burns, 1 GA. L. Rnv. 687, 693 (1973). This
would seem to destroy most of Wiley's force, for it would eliminate an arbitrator's
power to bind an unwilling successor to substantive terms of a labor agreement to
which it was not a party. The courts seem to have been unwilling to take Burns
this far. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713,
725-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
68. See 406 U.S. at 287-90.
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ing values than on any logical deductions from Wiley and Burns." 69
That the principles of Wiley had not been totally abrogated by
Burns was made clear in the Supreme Court's third successor-employer decision, Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB. 70 That case
presented the issue whether a successor employer could be required
by the NLRB to remedy the unfair labor practices of its predecessor.
Prior to Golden State Bottling Company's sale of its soft drink bottling
and distribution business to All American Beverages, the NLRB had
found that Golden State committed an unfair labor practice in discharging a certain driver-salesman and had ordered Golden State, "its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns," to reinstate him with back
pay. All American acquired the business as a bona fide purchaser,
but with knowledge of the outstanding Board order, and continued to
operate the enterprise "without interruption or substantial changes in
method of operation, employee complement, or supervisory personnel."71 The Board concluded that All American was a "successor"
for purposes of the NLRA and ordered All American to reinstate the
driver-salesman; Golden State and All American were held jointly
and severally liable for the driver's back pay.72 The order was enforced by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 73
The Supreme Court affirmed and thereby gave its approval for
the first time to the Board's Perma Vinyl 74 doctrine that a successor
employer must remedy the unfair labor practices of its predecessor.
The Court rejected the argument that the Board's issuance of a
reinstatment and back pay order against a bona fide successor was
barred by section lO(c) of the NLRA, 75 which authorizes remedial
orders only against "such persons" as the Board has found to have
engaged in an unfair labor practice. The Court stated that it had
"[e]arly on" found that the Board's remedial powers under section
lO(c) extended beyond the actual perpetrator of an unfair labor
practice and "applied, not only to a new employer who is 'merely a
disguised continuance of the old employer,' . . . but also 'in appropriate circumstances . . . [to] those to whom the business may have
been transferred, whether as a means of evading the judgment or for

other reasons.' " 76
69. St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 277.
70. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
71. 414 U.S. at 170-71.
72. 187 N.L.R.B. 1017 (1971).
73. 467 F..2d 164 (1972).
74. Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), enforced sub nom. United
States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
76. 414 U.S. at 176, quoting Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100,
106 (1942), and Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945) (emphasis
added by the Court).
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Finally, the Court concluded that the Board's order equitably
balanced "the conflicting legitimate interests of the bona fide successor, the public, and the affected employee," 77 and that the Board, in
emphasizing the need to protect the victimized employee, had properly relied on Wiley. 78 In the Court's view, however, its holding "in
no way" 79 qualified Burns:
[U]nlike Burns, where an important labor policy opposed saddling
the successor employer with the obligations of the collective-bargaining agreement, there is no underlying congressional policy here
militating against the imposition of liability.
[Moreover, a]voidance of labor strife, prevention of a deterrent
effect on the exercise of rights [regarding union activities] guaranteed
employees by§ 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and protection for the
victimized employee-all mportant policies subserved by the National
Labor Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C § 141-are achieved [here] at a
relatively minimal cost to the bona fide successor. 80

Golden State demonstrated the continuing vitality of Wiley's
policy in favor of affording employees protection in a transition situation at some expense to the successor employer. But the case suggested no new standards for determining when duties are properly
imposed on a successor. The Court did note that the labor-law doctrine of successorship applied not only to the merger situation of
Wiley but also to purchases of assets because, "so long as there is a
continuity in the 'employmg industry,' the public policies underlying
the doctrine will be served by its broad application." 81 However, in
view of the transfer of assets from Golden State to All American,
the continuity in operations, and the continuity of identity of the work
force, the Court was not compelled to analyze the factors involved in
the Board's finding of a continuing business enterprise.

II. A CRITIQUE OF Howard Johnson
It was in light of Burns, Wiley, and Golden State, that the
Supreme Court decided its most recent successorship case, Howard
Johnson. Howard Johnson Company made a bona fide purchase of
the personal property used in the operation of a motor lodge and
restaurant, and leased the underlying real property, from the Grissom
family, which had owned and operated the enterprises under fran77. 414 U.S. at 181.
78. 414 U.S. at 181-82.
79. 414 U.S. at 184. Golden State clearly put to rest the doubt expressed by
one writer, Swerdlow, Freedom of Contract in Labor Law: Burns, H.K. Porter, and
Section 8(d), 51 TExAs L REV. 1, 15 (1972), that the Perma Vinyl doctrine could
survive Burns.
80. 414 U.S. at 185.
81. 414 U.S. at 183 n.S.
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chise agreements with Howard Johnson. The collective bargaining
agreements entered into by the Grissoms and the union representing
the employees at both establishments82 contained arbitration clauses
and provided that the agreements would be binding upon the Grissoms' "successors, assigns, purchasers, lessees or transferees." Howard Johnson, however, explicitly refused to assume any of the Grissoms' labor obligations, and, while Howard Johnson continued to
operate the enterprises in substantially the same manner as had the
Grissoms, it hired only nine of the Grissoms' fifty-three employees in
assembling its work force of forty-five. In response, the union filed a
section 301 suit to compel Howard Johnson to arbitrate under the
agreements signed by the Grissoms. 83
on· review, 84 the Supreme Court held that Howard Johnson was
under no duty to arbitrate. In so doing, the Court found it necessary,
first, to apply Burns and, second, to distinguish Wiley. In brief, the
Court stated that, because the same national labor policies govern the
NLRB and the courts, the policies of Burns were applicable to section
301 suits as well as to actions before the NLRB. - From Burns the
Court extracted the rule that a successor employer could not be
compelled to hire any of its predecessor's employees. Applying this
rule in Howard Johnson, the Court concluded that an arbitration
order was inappropriate because the union's principal purpose in
seeking arbitration was to compel the hiring of the Grissom employees not retained by Howard Johnson. The Court then endeavored to
demonstrate that Wiley did not dictate a different result. It distinguished that case on two factual grounds: First, Wiley was a merger
cas~, which meant that it was set against a background of state law
imposing duties on the successor, and that, since Interscience disappeared in the merger, the employees had no remedy unless they
could obtain relief from the successor. Second, in Wiley there was
continuity in the identity of the work force. This continuity meant
that the union's section 301 suit was brought on behalf of employees
working for the successor employer rather than on behalf of those not
retained. Moreover, the Court said, this continuity was necessary to
82. The restaurant employees were represented by the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, and the motor lodge employees by Local
75 of the Hotel, Motel, and Restaurant Employees Union. Since the two unions were
"apparently identical in interest and goveman!=e," Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit
Local Joint Exec. Bd., 482 F.2d 489, 491 n.3 (6th Cir. 1973), and since both were
represented in this litigation by the Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, they will
be referred to herein as "the union," as they were by the Supreme Court. See 417
U.S. at 251 & n.1.
83. The district court held that Howard Johnson was required to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under the agreements, although it refused to issue a preliminary
injunction requiring Howard Johnson to hire all Grissom employees. Detroit Local
Joint Exec. Bd. v. Howard Johnson Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 2329 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affd.,
482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973).
84. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
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the finding of the continuity of the business enterprise on which the
duty to arbitrate in Wiley was based.
The remainder of this Note examines in detail the significance of
the Court's reasoning at each of these steps and considers the merits
of a possible new approach to successorship problems that the Court
suggested in a footnote in Howard Johnson.
In determining that the principles of Burns were applicable to
section 301 suits, the Court appeared to undercut the importance of
the distinction between the NLRB and the federal courts-a distinction upon which commentators had relied in attempting to reconcile
Burns and Wiley. Burns applied, the Court stated, because the
power of the federal courts to fashion a federal common law in
section 301 suits, expressly recognized in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 85 could properly be exercised only in consonance with
the principles of the NLRA, the same body of law that governs the
NLRB. "It would be plainly inconsistent with this view," the Court
reasoned, "to say that the basic policies found controlling in an unfair
labor practice context may be disregarded by the courts in a suit
under § 301, and thus to permit the rights enjoyed by the new
employer in a successorship context to depend upon the forum in
which the union presses its claims." 86 Although the Court did not
explain to which "basic policies" it was alluding, it arguably implied
that courts as well as the NLRB are bound by the strong national
policy, discussed in Burns, against the imposition of labor-contract
terms on unconsenting parties. If this implication is correct and
courts are barred from imposing contract terms, then it is no longer
possible to reconcile Burns and Wiley on the basis of differences in
the forums.
The Court's apparent implication that courts and the NLRB are
not permitted to reach different results on the extent of a successor
employer's labor-law obligations also seems to undermine the distinction between Burns and Wiley based on the fact that Wiley involved
the enforcement of an arbitration clause. 87 Since, under Burns, the
NLRB apparently can never impose contract terms on unconsenting
parties, inconsistent results can be avoided totally only if courts are
similarly precluded from enforcing any contract provisions, including
arbitration clauses. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the policy reasons favoring arbitration as a method of settling disputes would
support the creation of an exception to this blanket prohibition of
judicial enforcement of contract terms since the Court in Howard
Johnson, in concluding that arbitration was inappropriate, nowhere
mentioned the national policy favoring arbitration.
85. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
86. 417 U.S. at 256.
81. See text at notes 56-57 supra.
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Still, the Howard Johnson Court stopped short of holding that
Wiley and Burns are irreconcilable. This can perhaps be explained
by the fact that, although the Court implied that it favored the Burns
policy against the imposition of contract terms on an unwilling party,
it did not rely on this policy in reaching its result. Instead, it
extracted from Burns only a specific rule that a successor employer is
free not to hire his predecessor's employees88 and a general policy
favoring the free transfer and reorganization of business. Thus,
while Howard Johnson reflects Burns' emphasis on the rights of the
successor employer rather than Wiley's concern for the protection of
employees, it does leave room for the continued application of Wiley.
This is true because, while the rule that a successor employer cannot
be compelled to retain its predecessor's employees restricts Wiley, it
does not preclude the enforcement of arbitration directed toward
other employee claims. In essence, the Court in Howard Johnson
was unwilling to allow the union to circumvent this specific rule by
seeking to force rehiring through a section 301 suit to compel arbitration.
·
Thus, it is possible to view Howard Johnson as holding merely
88. The Court stated, "Clearly, Burns establishes that Howard Johnson had the
right not to hire any of the former Grissom employees, if it so desired." 414 U.S.
at 262. This statement is qualified by an appended footnote, which observes that
the new employer commits an unfair labor practice if he refuses to hire former employees solely because of their union membership "or to avoid having to recognize
the union." 417 U.S. at 262 n.8. But this right, even as qualified by the Court's
footnote, is not so clear on the face of Burns. The Howard Johnson conclusion rests
on the statements in Burns that a potential employer may be willing to take over
a business only if he can make various changes in it, including changes in the labor
force, 406 U.S. at 287-88, and that, if the Board's position were not reversed in that
case, "[i]t would seemingly follow that employees of the predecessor would be
deemed employees of the successor, dischargeable only in accordance with provisions
of the contract and subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions thereof. Bums
would not have been free to replace Wackenhut's guards with its own except as the
contract permitted." 406 U.S. at 288, quoted in 417 U.S. at 261-62. The Court's
reaction in Burns was quite a natural one. It would seem unjust and impractical in
a competitive bidding situation to impose a duty on an employer to hire his competitor's employees simply because he had won a contract at the location where those
employees worked. The result might be less unjust, however, when a new employer
has acquired an ongoing business. In this situation, the burden of such a duty on
the employer could be balanced against the interests of the employees involved.
Wiley could be read as implying such a duty for the successor employer, and the
NLRB even appeared to be moving in that direction in a case decided shortly after
Wiley, Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965). But no such distinction seems
to have been made by the courts, and the Court's conclusion in Howard Johnson was
not a novel one. In Golden State, for instance, it said "the purchaser is not obligated
by the Act to hire any of the predecessor's employees." 414 U.S. at 184 n.6.
Nevertheless, Golden State itself demonstrated that, under special circumstances,
the successor employer could be compelled to rehire an individual employee of the
predecessor. Stated more precisely, then, the rule is that the successor employer who
does not assume his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement has the right not
to hire any of the predecessor's employees (in the sense that he is under no contract
obligation to hire them) and his failure to hire them is not in itself an unfair labor
practice.
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that Burns applies in section 301 suits only in so far as it proscribes
requiring a successor employer to hire his predecessor's employees.
Limiting the Howard Johnson holding in this manner leaves room for
the accommodation of Burns and Wiley under the balancing test,
discussed below, that is discernible from Howard Johnson, and rationally explains the Court's refusal to conclude that its decision
overruled Wiley.
Upon finding Burns applicable and a bar to arbitration in Howard Johnson, the Court turned to distinguishing Wiley, which the
lower courts had found to be controlling and to compel arbitration.
While the Court found Wiley inapplicable to the facts before it, it
distinguished the case in such a way as to suggest that Wiley might
have continuing vitality. The two primary factual distinctions that
the Court observed between Wiley and Howard Johnson were that
Wiley involved a merger rather than a sale of assets and that Wiley
retained essentially all of the Interscience employees whereas Howard
Johnson hired only a few of the Grissom employees. Each of these
differences was significant for two reasons.
The merger aspect of Wiley was important, in the Court's view,
first, because the background of state law obligating the surviving
corporation "suggest[ed] that holding Wiley bound to arbitrate under its predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement [might] have
been fairly within the reasonable expectations of the parties." 89 But,
the Court's attempt to distinguish Wiley on this "background of state
law'' basis, like its attempt to do so in Burns, 00 is unpersuasive in view
of the emphasis in Wiley on federal labor policies and on the federal
rather than state character of its holding. And, although the "reasonable expectations of the parties" does seem to be a consideration
relevant to the imposition of a duty to arbitrate, the Court apparently
neglected several factors in Howard Johnson bearing on such expectations. In Howard Johnson, the business was continued in the same
location, under the same name, and using a similar mode of operation. Moreover, there was a significant nexus between the two
employers in the transfer of physical assets and in the former franchise relationship. In light of Wiley and of these various indicia of
successorship that have led to the survival of labor obligations, arbitration could well have been within the reasonable expectations of the
parties in Howard Johnson.
Perhaps the Court concluded that
arbitration is not reasonably expected by the parties where, as in
Howard Johnson, the carry-over of employees between the two enterprises is less than substantial. If so, Wiley might still apply where
there is substantial work force continuity, whether or not a merger is
involved.
89. 417U.S.at257.
90. See text at note 59 supra.
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The Court's second reason for considering the merger aspect of
Wiley important involved the availability to the union of alternative
means to enforce obligations undertaken by the predecessor employer. 91 In Wiley, the predecessor disappeared in the merger and
thus left the union without a remedy unless one was available against
the successor. In Howard Johnson, however, the former employer,
the Grissom family, not only was still in existence ''with substantial
retained assets," but was willing to arbitrate the extent of its liability
under the agreement. Moreover, although the successor clause in the
agreement was wholly ineffective to bind the unconsenting buyer, the
Grissom family still remained liable for its breach.
The availability of a realistic remedy against the predecessor
employer does seem to be at least a partial justification for the denial
of an arbitration order against the new employer. 92 The Court's use
of this factor is significant. By distinguishing Wiley on the ground
that the union in Howard Johnson had "a realistic remedy" against
the Grissoms, 93 the Court again implied that Wiley could have vitality
outside the merger context since there may well be sellers of
businesses from whom, realistically, no more relief can be obtained
than from a merged corporation. The Grissoms, after all, were in the
position to satisfy a damage award entered against them: they retained a continuing income from the lease of property to Howard
Johnson, a circumstance hardly universal in sale of assets cases. If,
as Howard Johnson implies, the possibility of remedy against a
former employer will preclude the imposition on the successor of a
duty to arbitrate only when the remedy is a realistic one, then arbitration will not be precluded in every sale of assets case.
If Howard Johnson is read as stating that Wiley potentially applies whenever a "realistic" remedy for the employees is lacking, it
becomes necessary to determine what remedies are "realistic." A
remedy is a "realistic" alternative from the employees' point of view
only if it can adequately compensate for the relief that they might
obtain were the successor employer required to arbitrate. The nature
of the relief obtainable through such arbitration is therefore relevant
to the issue whether the availability of some other remedy should be a
bar to arbitration. If the employees' recovery through arbitration is
limited to the satisfaction of claims that accrued or that in some sense
"vested" 94 under the old employer, then it would seem reasonable to
91. See 417 U.S. at257-58.
92. Indeed, this point was noted shortly after Wiley itself. See Shaw & Carter,
supra note 10, at 366-69. The availability of a remedy against the predecessor seems
to have influenced courts occasionally, but has never been controlling. See, e.g., McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F.2d 352, 356 (2d Cir. 1966).
93. 417 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added).
94. The union in Wiley claimed that the rights it sought to enforce through arbitration had "vested" in the employees under the collective bargaining agreement. 376
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lay the burden of satisfaction solely on the old employer if recovery
against him is practicable. Howard Johnson suggests, however, that
Wiley also provides those employees retained in a business transfer
some protection against "sudden changes in the terms and conditions
of their employment." 95 This implies that retained employees may
indeed have rights, other than the narrowly defined ones accrued
before the transfer, over which arbitration would be appropriate. If
those rights relate to the terms and conditions upon which employees
are retained by the successor employer, full relief for their violation
may be available only from the new employer. In such a situation,
the continued existence of the predecessor should not automatically
bar the imposition of obligations on the successor. Instead, courts
should balance the relevant interests in an effort to determine
whether money damages adequately compensate the employee for
the nonenforcement of the term, and sufficiently protect him from
the impact of changes in the terms and conditions of employment, to
justify freeing the successor employer from a duty to arbitrate. 00
U.S. at 545. The rights at issue included seniority status, pension contributions, job
security and grievance provisions, severance pay, and vacation pay, all of which the
union sought to have accorded the employees "now and after January 30, 1962," the
expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement. 376 U.S. at 552.
Arguably, Wiley can be limited to the imposition of a duty to arbitrate over only
those rights that "vested" prior to the transfer of ownership. It is difficult to define
"vested," however, without including all rights that an employee might have under
a collective bargaining agreement. Yet, NLRB Member Jenkins dissented from the
Board's action in Burns on the ground that Wiley applied only when vested rights
were at issue. In his view, the rights at issue in Wiley were rights "which were fixed
or already accrued by being, at least in part, earned through past performance of
work . . . ." William J. Bums Intl. Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348
(1970). Moreover, the Court in Howard Johnson stated that "the disappearance of
the original employing entity in the Wiley merger meant that unless the union were
afforded some remedy against Wiley, it would have no means to enforce the obligations voluntarily undertaken by the merged corporation, to the extent that those obligations vested prior to the merger or to the extent that its promises were intended
to survive a change of ownership." 417 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added), While lower
courts applying Wiley have not distinguished between vested and nonvested rights,
see, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir,
1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.
1964); cf. United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.
1974) (enforcing an arbitrator's order that a successor employer honor the dues
check off and wage reopener provisions of its predecessor's agreement), future cases
attempting to reconcile Wiley, Burns, and Howard Johnson may well attempt to make
such a distinction.
95. 417 U.S. at 264.
96. The Howard Johnson Court noted that, in the case before it, the union could
have sought to enjoin the sale of the business as a breach of the successorship clause
of the collective bargaining agreement. The Court did not decide, however, whether
this particular remedy standing alone is sufficiently realistic to preclude application
of Wiley. It would seem that in many situations, this remedy is not a realistic one,
The remedy is available, of course, only when there is a successorship clause in the
agreement, and the remedy must be sought before the transfer takes place. In many
instances, however, the union has little or no time in which to act prior to the transfer, and the possibility of an injunction may simply be a further incentive for employers to maximize the secrecy of their transactions. Indeed, potential successor em-
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The presence or absence of a realistic alternative remedy is also a
partial justification for the apparently differing standards that the
Court has used to determine when particular labor obligations survive
a change in ownership. The Court's general reluctance to impose
contract obligations on a successor employer is perhaps justifiable on
the ground that there is often a remedy available against the contracting predecessor employer. The Court's greater willingness to require
the successor employer to bargain with the union might similarly
follow from the fact that it is impossible to obtain adequate alternative relief from the predecessor. Finally, the fact that unfair labor
practices may be adequately remedied only by the successor employer
helps explain Golden State, where the successor was ordered to
reinstate an employee of its predecessor and was held jointly liable
with the predecessor for back pay. That the Court desired to accord
full relief is evidenced by the fact that it held both employers liable
for the unfair labor practice.
It is of course clear, however, that the absence of a realistic
remedy against the predecessor employer cannot alone justify the
imposition of labor obligations on the successor, for other circumstances and policies may preclude this result. In particular, continuity of identity of the business enterprise remains a condition to the
application of Wiley.
The second and more decisive ground upon which the Howard
Johnson Court distinguished Wiley was that Wiley had voluntarily
employed essentially all of the Interscience employees while Howard
Johnson had chosen its own work force. This fact was significant in
the first instance because, unlike the union in Wiley, which represented employees who stayed at their jobs through the transfer, the
union in Howard Johnson represented employees of the Grissoms
who had not been retained, and the union's primary objective was to
force their reinstatement. In Howard Johnson, but not in Wiley,
ployers were already being advised to say as little regarding the transfer as possible
to the union involved. See Rovins & Rosen, Labor Law Obligations of Parties to
the Sale of a Business, 25 LAB. L.J. 231,238 (1974).
Even where an injunction halting the transfer is feasible, the fact that the union
has failed to seek injunctive relief should not bar a remedy against the successor employer if there is no further remedy against the former employer. First, the union
may not know whether the transfer will have an adverse impact on its interests until
the transfer has occurred and the new employer has made clear his intentions. Second, if unions are forced to seek injunctive relief to avoid forfeiting their claims, the
result may well be to embroil many transfers in time-consuming litigation that frustrates the national policy frequently espoused by the Court of facilitating the free
flow of capital. Finally, it will be possible in many instances for courts to make
available the usual contract remedies of damages and specific performance. In such
instances, there is little logic behind withdrawing these normal remedies and requiring employees to pursue a particular remedy that may be less desirable from their
point of view.
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therefore, the union's purpose ran directly counter to the right of the
new employer to hire his own work force. 97
In light of the union's purpose in Howard Johnson, the Court
could have rested its decision solely on the proposition that the right
to continued employment is not a contract right that can survive a
change in ownership of a business. Instead, it proceeded to find the
lack of work force continuity important for a second reason: The
continuity of the business enterprise required by Wiley before a duty
to arbitrate can be imposed, the Court asserted, exists only where
there is continuity of identity of the work force. 98 Because work
force continuity was lacking in Howard Johnson, this assertion carried the implication that the union was barred not only from seeking
arbitration over the reinstatement of employees, but also from seeking
to enforce other rights under the collective bargaining agreement on
behalf either of those hired by Howard Johnson or of those not
retained. 99
It is not apparent why the number of employees retained by the
successor employer should in itself be determinative of the availability
of relief for benefits accrued under an agreement with the predecessor. If the rights sought to be enforced are vested in the narrow sense
of having accrued prior to the transfer, such as rights to accrued
vacation or severence pay, it should not matter whether those represented by the union are presently employed by the successor. This is
not to say that continuity of identity of the work force is or should be
irrelevant. Work force continuity is clearly relevant in determining
whether there exists the requisite continuity of identity of the business
enterprise. Moreover, when the dispute is over union-wide rights,
such as dues check-offs, rather than over strictly individual employee
rights, continuity of identity of the work force may even be the
controlling consideration. It is unnecessary, however, to bar arbitration over all claims just because a lack of continuity in the work force
generally affects the rights and remedies claimed by a union.
As the ultimate basis for its holding, the Court's conclusion that
work force continuity is a prerequisite to the imposition of a duty to
arbitrate suffers from certain flaws. First of all, the conclusion is
vulnerable to the argument, made by the lower courts in this case and
repeated by Justice, Douglas in his dissent, 100 that the majority was
97. 417 U.S. at 258-62.
98. 417 U.S. at 263-64.
99. Thus, a California court, applying Howard Johnson, refused to distinguish the
case before it on the basis that the union there was seeking to enforce contract terms
for the benefit of employees of the defendant; the court held that, in the absence
of evidence of substantial continuity in the work force, the buyer of a restaurant was
not obligated to recognize the union that represented the seller's employees or to adhere to their collective bargaining agreement. See Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. 3539
Century, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 821, 824-25, 121 Cal. Rptr. 40, 42-43 (1975).
100. 417 U.S. at 267, citing 482 F .2d at 493.
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bootstrapping by saying in effect that because Howard Johnson did
not hire the Grissoms' employees it was under no duty to hire them.
Clearly, an employer's failure to fulfill a duty is no evidence that he
had no such duty. In representation cases, the fact that an employer
has wrongfully refused to hire members of a union does not in itself
protect him from an action by the union. The employer could be
ordered by the NLRB to recognize and bargain with the union, even
though he had apparently succeeded in preventing a union majority in
the new work force. 101 The Court could have avoided this logical
trap by basing its decision solely on the proposition that a successor
need not arbitrate over hiring (or firing) the employees of his predecessor.
A further problem with the Court's conclusion is the difficulty in
applying it. The Court said that a "substantial continuity in the
identity of the work force" 102 is required before there can be such
continuity of identity of the business enterprise as will make Wiley
applicable. In explanation, the Court stated only that "[t]he Wiley
Court seemingly recognized this, ·as it found the requisite continuity
present there in reliance on the 'wholesale transfer' of Interscience
employees to Wiley," 103 and that the lower courts had reflected this
view in their emphasis on "whether the successor employer hires a
majority of the predecessor's employees . . . in § 301 suits under
Wiley." 104 The Court's use of the term "substantial" leaves room for
some flexibility in deciding whether the requisite work force continuity is present in individual cases. The reference to lower court decisions, however, suggests that the Court considered the determining
factor to be whether a majority of the predecessor's employees are
hired, although in at least one of the cases cited by the Court1° 5 the
retained employees constituted a majority of the successor's work
force but not a majority of the predecessor's work force.
There is little reason why a continuity of identity of the enterprise
can exist only where a majority of the predecessor's employees has
been retained. In representation cases, a majority test is justified:
Unless, as in Burns, a majority of the new work force is made up of
101. See K.B. & J. Young's Super Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463, 465
(9th Cir. 1967). Cf. NLRB v. Bums Intl. Security Servs. Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 27980 (1972) ("It goes without saying, of course, that Bums was not entitled to upset
what it should have accepted as an established union majority by soliciting representation cards for another union and thereby committing the unfair labor practice of
which it was found guilty by the Board").
102. 417 U.S. at 263.
103. 417 U.S. at 263.
104. 417 U.S. at 263-64 (footnote omitted).
105. Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel Employees v. Joden, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 390 (D.
Mass. 1966), cited in 417 U.S. at 264 n.10 (continuity of business enterprise evidenced by a "significant number" of predecessor's employees where successor hired
12 of predecessor's 29 or 30 employees for new work force of 18 or 19).
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workers formerly employed by the predecessor, the union representing the retained employees cannot be presumed to have rthe support
of a majority of the new work force. But, clearly this Burns majority
test need not be satisfied in the arbitration context. Indeed, in Wiley
itself, the union represented only a small minority of the new work
force, yet still had the right to arbitrate. 106 The situation can arise in
which only a minority of the predecessor's employees are retained, but
those employees constitute a majority of the new work force. The
successor employer in such a case will be obliged under Burns to
recognize and bargain with the incumbent union if other factors
support a finding of successorship to the business enterprise. But if a
separate majority test must be met for Wiley to apply, that is, if a
majority of the predecessor's employees must be retained, then arbitration under the predecessor's contract will not be required. There
is no apparent justification for such a rigid result. Moreover, in view
of the degree to which successorship cases in different contexts draw
upon each other, confusion seems likely to result from the establishment of a "majority of the work force" test in arbitration cases
different from that applied in representation cases.
In determining whether continuity in the work force exists sufficient to support an arbitration order under Wiley, the best approach is
to eschew any mechanistic majority test and decide whether there
exists "substantial continuity in the identity of the work force" on the
facts of each case. i-o 7 Such an approach is not unduly favorable to
the union in arbitration cases, for, whether or not measured by a strict
majority test, continuity of identity of the work force is only one
element of the required continuity of the business enterprise. 108 Just
as a new: employer will not be ordered to recognize and bargain with
an incumbent union where a change in size of the work force or other
aspect of the operation has rendered the bargaining unit inappropriate, even though a majority of his employees formerly worked for
his predecessor, so too the new employer will not be obliged to
arbitrate in the face of such changes. Furthermore, the arbitrator in
successorship cases may properly consider the effect of a change in
the size of the work force, as well as other changes in the business
106. See 376 U.S. at 551 n.5.
107. This seems to have been the approach taken in post-Howard Johnson cases
so far. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists, 504 F.2d 307, 320
(5th Cir. 1974) (retention of 35% of old work force, which constituted 39% of new
work force, held to be insufficient continuity in case of successorship through competitive bidding for service contract); Local 775, Retail Clerks Union v. Purity
Stores, Inc., 41 Cal. App. 3d 225, 230-31, 116 Cal. Rptr. 40, 42-43 (1974) (retention
of "a considerable number of employees," though less than a majority, held sufficient
to obligate buyer of grocery who came under "new owner" terms of seller's collective
bargaining agreement).
108. Boeing Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists, 504 F.2d 307, 321 (5th Cir.
1974).
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operation, in deciding whether it is appropriate to enforce the old
collective bargaining agreement. 109 In light of Howard Johnson's
mandate that continuity of identity of the work force be determinative of a successor employer's duty to arbitrate, a case-by-case determination of the substantiality of such continuity seems desirable.

ill.

FOOTNOTE

9-A NEW BALANCING APPROACH

Because of the numerous factual differences among successorship
cases, the variety of obligations that might survive a change in ownership, and the varying strengths of the interests of employers and
employees, a case-by-case evaluation of all the factors in every successorship case seems most appropriate. The Supreme Court apparently
reached this conclusion in footnote 9 in Howard Johnson. In that
note, the Court rejected the approach, taken by many lower courts in
successorship cases, of deciding first that the employer is a "successor" and then asking whether a "successor employer'' has the legal
obligation at issue:
But the real question in each of these "successorship" cases is, on
the particular facts, what are the legal obligations of the new employer
to the employees of the former owner or their representative. The
answer to this inquiry requires analysis of the interests of the new
employer and the employees and of the policies of the labor laws
in light of the facts of each case and the particular legal obligation
which is at issue, whether it be •the duty to recognize and bargain
with the union, the duty to remedy unfair labor practices, the duty
to arbitrate, etc. There is, and can be, no single definition of "successor" which iis applicable in every legal context. A new employer,
in other words, may be a successor for some purposes and not for
others.110

This approach toward successorship· law seems reasonable, for the
balancing suggested by the Court allows for the needed diversity in
results within a framework of law.
Perhaps the primary deterrent to lower-court use of the test is that
the Court did not appear to employ it in Howard Johnsqn. Undeniably, the Court deliberately confined its findings as to Howard Johnson's successorship status to the issue of the obligation to arbitrate
and refrained from applying ( or denying) the label of "successor
employer" for any other purpose. Furthermore, the Court did note
some of the factors properly considered in applying the balancing
109. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 355 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir.
1964).
110. 417 U.S. at 262-63 n.9. Earlier in its opinion the Court stated that "[p]articularly in light of the difficulty of the successorship question, the myriad factual
circumstances and legal contexts -in which it can arise, and the absence of congressional guidance as to its resolution, emphasis on the facts of each case as it arises
is especially appropriate." 417 U.S. at 256.
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test-the circumstances surrounding the sale as they bore on the
· reasonable expectations of the parties and on the availability of
alternative remedies, and the policies against compelling the new
employer to hire his predecessor's employees. Nevertheless, the
Court failed to carry through on the balancing approach in two ways:
It resorted to arbitrary rules of law instead of evaluating the case in
terms of the interests and policies involved, and it failed to analyze
with particularity the obligation at issue.
One rule insisted upon by the Court was that the new employer
had the right not to hire any of his predecessor's employees. But
Golden State demonstrates that this successor employer right is not
absolute. 111 No harm in this instance, however, flowed from the
Court's fajlure to acknowledge that this "rule" of law can be overridden by opposing considerations, because the result reached was a
reasonable one on the basis of the facts and interests involved. No
special circumstances like those in Golden State counterbalanced the
employer's interest in rearranging the business through changes in
personnel and the societal interest in encouraging the free flow of
capital and economic efficiency. In view of the great burden that
would have fallen on Howard Johnson had it been required to hire
the Grissoms' employees, and in view of the availability of other relief
for those employees, the Court was warranted in refusing to require
Howard Johnson to arbitrate.
The Court in Howard Johnson, however, also propounded another, considerably less justifiable, rule of law-that the continuity of
identity of the business enterprise requisite to the imposition of an
obligation to -arbitrate under Wiley "necessarily includes . . . a
substantial continuity in the identity of the work force across the
change in ownership." 112 As discussed above, 113 continuity of identity
of the business enterprise may be evidenced by a number of factors
and itself is but one of the factors bearing on the balancing-ofinterests test suggested in footnote 9. Work force continuity has long
been recognized as an important element, but it need not, under a
balancing of interests approach, be conclusive on the issue of the
obligation to arbitrate. The Court's categorical statement, therefore,
is inconsistent with the balancing approach that it suggested.
The Court seemed to find this categorical rule necessary to justify
its denial of arbitration in Howard Johnson. In so doing, the Court
failed to identify clearly the obligation at issue and thus again fell
short of carrying through on the balancing approach. Had the Court
more consistently recognized that the issue in Howard Johnson was
the specific obligation to rehire the old employees rather than simply
111. See text at notes 70-81 supra.
112. 417 U.S. at 263.
113. See text at notes 16-22 supra.
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the general duty to arbitrate, it could have reached the result it
desired without laying down this categorical limitation on both the
obligation to arbitrate and the balancing test itself. A balancing of
the interests in Howard Johnson would have supported the conclusion
that Howard Johnson was not obliged to hire the Grissoms' employees. Because the union's primary object in seeking arbitration was to
compel such hiring, it should therefore have also supported the conclusion that arbitration should be denied.
·
The Court's failure to focus on the specific obligation at issue in
Howard Johnson in balancing the opposing interests apparently followed from its adoption of a unitary view of the duty to arbitrate. In
footnote 9, the Court spoke only of general categories of obligations:
"the duty to recognize and bargain with the union, the duty to remedy
unfair labor practices, the duty to arbitrate, etc." A proper balancing
of interests, however, can occur only if a court looks behind the
general duty and analyzes the specific obligation at issue. 114 The
"duty to remedy unfair labor practices," for example, might entail
reinstating a single employee or recognizing a union. The relative
strength of the relevant factors in these two situations clearly would
vary drastically. Similarly, the duty to arbitrate might be the focal
point of disputes over a number of different possible contractual obligations, the interests surrounding each of which might balance differently. A union might be seeking the enforcement of contract terms
relating to working conditions or the recovery of benefits accrued
under the former employer. The burden on the successor employer
and the relevance of a solvent predecessor's continued existence both
clearly differ according to which of these two remedies the union
seeks from arbitration. And, in implementing the footnote 9 balancing test, courts can and must consider the varying impact of these
factors. The relevance of the composition of the new work force will
also vary. But by stating in Howard Johnson that arbitration should
be denied whenever continuity of identity in the work force is lacking,
the Court in effect conclusively presumed that work force continuity
is always relevant and thereby limited the ability of lower courts to
balance accurately the interests in each case. This seems an unfortunate result of needlessly general language, for, contrary to the Court's
assertion in Howard Johnson, the result was not necessary to a
reconciliation of "the protection afforded employee interests in a
change of ownership in Wiley . . . with the new employer's right to
operate the enterprise with his own independent labor force." 115
Even though Howard Johnson itself failed to employ fully the
114. The California court failed to recognize this in Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. 3539
Century, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 821, 826, 121 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43 (1975). The court
cited the broad categories of obligations listed in Howard Johnson and refused to
analyze the claimed subjects for arbitration.
115. 417 U.S. at 264.
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balancing approach that it suggested, the approach does merit further
development. While the footnote in Howard Johnson is sketchy,
prior successorship cases identifying the various relevant considerations may be drawn upon to clarify the Court's meaning. In general
terms, the interests of the employer and of the employees are apt to be
similar from case to case. The new employer's interest lies in maximizing his freedom to reorganize his business and in minimizing his
labor obligations. The employees, on the other hand, seek to retain
their jobs and whatever benefits they have accrued under their former
employer with as little disruption of the conditions of their employment as possible. Because the interests in specific cases are more
particular, and vary in weight according to the legal obligation at issue, they cannot be balanced in the abstract. Since the interests of
employers and employees are in fundamental conflict, the relative
strengths of the interests, the burden on the employer should he be
obligated as a "successor," the harshness on the employees of a denial
of the requested relief, and the reasonable expectations of the parties,
must all be considered if a fair result is to be reached.
Other factors courts should weigh in applying the footnote 9 test
to successorship problems are not difficult to perceive. Clearly, the
policies of the national labor laws are relevant. Among the policies
that have been identified are the policy favoring arbitration as a
method of resolving labor disputes, 116 the policy opposing any compulsion as to collective bargaining contract terms, 117 the policy of
encouraging free transfer of capital,118 and the general policy of
maintaining industrial peace and stability.U 0 Because these policies
may at times conflict, they must also be weighed in light of the
circumstances of each case and the obligation at issue.
As well as considering national policy, courts should carefully
examine the facts of each case, particularly as they explain the
interests and obligations involved. Continuity of the business enterprise is a prerequisite to the obligation to arbitrate because, presumably, employee interests never justify burdening the owner of an
essentially different business with labor obligations that he did not
assume. But, whether continuity of the business enterprise exists is
itself a question of fact, determined by examining factors such as the
continuity of the work force, the similarity of methods of operation
before and after the transfer, and the extent of the transfer of assets
from the old to the new employer.120 Each of these factors affects
116. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,549 (1964).
117. See NLRB v. Bums Intl. Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272,287 (1972).
118. See NLRB v. Bums Intl. Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972).
119. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 185 (1973); NLRB
v. Bums Intl. Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972); John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,549 (1964).
120. See text at notes 16-22 supra.
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the balance of the interests mentioned above. For example, it seems
fairer to require a new employer to assume labor obligations of his
predecessor when there has been a transfer of most of the assets of the
former employer's business than when the assets have not been transferred. Hence, a sale-of-assets case may be treated differently from a
case in which "successorship" is established through competitive bidding. The facts bearing on continuity in the enterprise are also
relevant as indicators of the reasonable expectations of the parties. As
the work force continuity, 'the similarity of methods of operation, and
the transfer of assets each increase, so too increase the expectations of
the new employer and the employees that labor obligations will
survive the transfer.
Besides the facts in a particular case that bear on "continuity of
identity of the business enterprise," courts have attached relevance to
the existence of a second union, the mode of transfer, and the
availability of alternative forms of relief. 121 The cases that found the
application of Wiley limited by the presence of a second union122 did
so in recognition of the fact that the interests of the predecessor's
employees may be outweighed by the interests of the successor's other
employees and their union, and the public's interest in industrial
peace. The mode of transfer of the business bears on the reasonable
expectations of the parties and, more importantly, affects the availability of alternative remedies. 123 The availability of relief from the
predecessor naturally affects the balance of employer and employee
interests: If the employees can recover complete relief from their
former employer, their case for burdening the successor employer is
weakened; on the other side, the extent of the burden on the successor
employer may depend on his ability to obtain either indemnification
from the predecessor for any obligation the successor must assume or
an adjustment in the purchase price of the business. Because the
availability of alternative remedies is not determined by any single
fact, such as the mode of transfer, courts weighing the impact of this
factor should examine carefully the facts of each case.
The particular labor obligation at issue has a significant effect on
the balancing of factors in a given case. Consequently, as Wiley and
Burns well illustrate, a successor employer in a given circumstance
may have some labor obligations imposed on him and not others. In
Wiley, the successor was found to have a duty to arbitrate the extent
of its obligations under its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, but would not have .had to recognize and bargain with the
121. See text at notes 23, 89 supra.
122. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
123. See text at note 89 supra.
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union as its employees' representative. 124 In Burns, on the other
hand, the Court decided that Burns was required to recognize and
bargain with the incumbent union, but was not required to honor the
collective bargaining agreement made by the union and the old
employer.
Taken together, Burns and Wiley suggest that the balancing
process should consider whether the union seeks to protect its interests through arbitration or through an action before the NLRB. 12 G An
arbitrator has flexibility in fashioning an award and can consider the
particular circumstances of the case that may make the imposition of
contract terms unfair to the new employer. 126 The burden of arbitration on the employer is therefore not as great as it would be were the
NLRB simply to order the employer to honor his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement-a factor that should be weighed in balancing competing interests. As noted above, 127 however, the Court
in Howard Johnson discredited attempts to distinguish between arbitrators and the NLRB because, in the Court's view, the substantive
result in a particular case should not depend upon the forum in which
employees seek to assert their rights. Consequently, lower courts
may be barred from taking this final factor into account.
The operation of the balancing process is illustrated by Golden
State, where the Court weighed opposing considerations in determining whether to require a successor employer to remedy the unfair
labor practice of his predecessor. In Golden State, the Court found
warranted the imposition on the successor of a duty to remedy the
predecessor's wrongful discharge of an employee. 128 The lack of an
alternative remedy for the employee, and the various ways open to the
employer to minimize his cost of compliance, were factors recognized
by the Court as particularly relevant to the obligation at issue. The
relief granted by the Court in Golden State should be noted once
again: The successor employer was compelled to hire one of his
predecessor's employees, even though, as the Court observed,120 he
was free under Burns not to hire any of the former employees. The
rule that the Court extracted from Burns and applied in Howard
Johnson, therefore, is less absolute than the Court implied. It is
rather like other policies of the labor laws: It must be considered in
light of the other interests involved, the facts of the case, and the
obligation at issue.
124.
125.
126.
1964).
127.
128.
129.

See 376 U.S. at 551 n.5.
See text at notes 55-51 supra.
United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 355 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir.
See text at note 86 supra.
See 414 U.S. at 185, quoted in the text at note 80 supra.
414 U.S. at 184 n.6, 188 n.10.
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CONCLUSION

The impact of Howard Johnson on successorship law is difficult
to summarize definitively. Howard Johnson related most directly to
Wiley and the duty of a successor employer to arbitrate under his
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, a duty that the Court
was careful to say was not totally abolished by its holding. Moreover, in footnote 9, the Court laid the basis for a reconciliation of
Wiley with the apparently conflicting principles of successorship law
applied in Burns and in Howard Johnson. Yet the continuing vitality
of Wiley, which had already been jeopardized by Burns, seems to
have been further impaired by Howard Johnson, for, rather than
taking advantage of the mode of analysis it suggested in footnote 9,
the Court announced a broad rule that continuity of identity of the
work force 1s a precondition to requiring a successor employer to
arbitrate under his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
Such a rule not only was unnecessary to reach the result in that case,
but it severely limited Wiley from a practical point of view by
allowing successor employers to avoid incurring an obligation to
arbitrate by not hiring a "substantial" number of their predecessors'
employees. 13° Furthermore, the emphasis in Howard Johnson was
less on the interests of the employees than on those of the new
employer. It seems accurate to conclude, therefore, that while Wiley
may have survived Howard Johnson, it has done so with diminished
vigor.
130. This means of evading the obligation may be impractical or undesirable for
some successor employers. When hiring his new work force, the employer must not,
of course, discriminate against the former employees because of their union membership lest he commit an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
Moreover, the old work force may well contain most, or even all, of the readily available workers with the particular skills required in the business, or the employer may
find it advantageous to keep operations going without the disruption of changing per~
sonnel. Nevertheless, the decision is left primarily in the employer's hands, and, in
many cases, the change in the work force will be effected easily.

